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Abstract
This paper aims at developing a logical theory of perspectival epis-
temic attitudes. After presenting a standard framework for modeling ac-
ceptance, where the epistemic space of an agent coincides with a unique
epistemic cell, more complex systems are introduced, which are charac-
terized by the existence of many connected epistemic cells, and different
possible attitudes towards a proposition, both positive and negative, are
discussed. In doing that, we also propose some interesting ways in which
the systems can be interpreted on well known epistemological standpoints.
1 Introduction
A preliminary view on the connections between the epistemic state of accep-
tance, the epistemic act of assenting, and the speech act of asserting is that,
in asserting, we express assent and, in assenting, we initiate a state of accep-
tance. A correspondent view on the connections between the epistemic state of
rejection, the epistemic act of dissenting, and the speech act of denial is that, in
denying, we express dissent and, in dissenting, we initiate a state of rejection.
Thus, if we endorse an equivalence thesis like
ET1: denying = asserting a negation
the possibility is open to define dissenting in terms of assenting, since expressing
a dissent comes to coincide with expressing an assent to a negation, and rejection
in terms of acceptance, since initiating a state of rejection comes to coincide with
initiating a state of acceptance of a negation. Hence, we can conclude that
ET2: rejecting = accepting a negation
ET2 can be put into question from different points of view (see [9] for a general
introduction). In particular, we can object either (i) that rejection is a primitive
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epistemic attitude, and so it is not to be identified with acceptance of a negation,
or (ii) that epistemic attitudes are perspectival, so that different notions of
acceptance and rejection are definable, whose connections are not completely
captured by a principle like ET2.
The main aim of this paper is to explore different ways of negating the
equivalence thesis and to develop a logical framework for capturing the idea that
epistemic attitudes are perspectival. The paper is structured as follows. In the
rest of this section, two ways of negating the equivalence thesis are proposed and
the perspectival approach to epistemic attitudes is outlined. In section 2, non-
perspectival systems are introduced and discussed. In section 3, perspectival
systems are introduced and appropriately axiomatized.
1.1 The negations of the equivalence thesis
Let us say that a position is epistemically paraconsistent if it admits of both
Aϕ and ¬R¬ϕ and epistemically paracomplete if it admits of both Rϕ and
¬A¬ϕ. We will focus on two general ways of negating the equivalence thesis,
which lead either to paraconsistent or to paracomplete positions. The first way
is a consequence of allowing for the possibility of alethic paraconsistency and
paracompleteness (see e.g. [8, 9]).
• Managing truth-value gaps and gluts
Paraconsistent option. Suppose we accept the possibility of truth-value gluts.
Then, we are in a position to accept both ϕ and the negation of ϕ, so that, if
acceptance and rejection are exclusive, we reject neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ. Thus, we
can accept ϕ without rejecting ¬ϕ, while the rejection of ϕ can either imply
(strong version) or not imply (liberal version) the acceptance of ¬ϕ. Hence
• Paraconsistency: Aϕ → R¬ϕ is not valid. For, Aϕ ∧A¬ϕ is admissible
and it is assumed thatAϕ excludesRϕ. (i) Strong version: Rϕ→ A¬ϕ is
valid, since Rϕ is assumed to be stronger than A¬ϕ. (ii) Liberal version:
Rϕ→ A¬ϕ is invalid, since Rϕ is not considered stronger than A¬ϕ.
Paracomplete option. Suppose we accept the possibility of truth-value gaps.
Then, we are in a position to reject both ϕ and the negation of ϕ, so that, if
acceptance and rejection are exclusive, we accept neither ϕ nor ¬ϕ. Thus, we
can reject ¬ϕ without accepting ϕ, while the acceptance of ϕ can either imply
(strong version) or not imply (liberal version) the rejection of ¬ϕ.
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• Paracompleteness: Rϕ→ A¬ϕ is not valid. For, Rϕ∧R¬ϕ is admissible
and it is assumed thatAϕ excludesRϕ. (i) Strong version: Aϕ→ R¬ϕ is
valid, since Aϕ is assumed to be stronger than R¬ϕ. (ii) Liberal version:
Rϕ→ A¬ϕ is invalid, since Aϕ is not considered stronger than R¬ϕ.
The second way of negating ET emerges when we try to merge different sources
of information.
• Managing sources of information
Suppose that we have two equally trustworthy sources of information about a
certain domain. These sources can agree or disagree on the valuation of specific
propositions, but they are not inconsistent, even if they can be silent on the
truth value of some proposition. Hence, it is possible for us to receive nine
kinds of report on the same proposition, where each report consists in a pair of
truth-values or blanks. Suppose that we decide to adopt a prudent approach,
accepting a proposition only if the sources agree on its truth-value, but rejecting
it when one source reports it as false and the other source is silent. Then, we
obtain a strongly paracomplete position. Suppose, in contrast, that we decide
to adopt an optimist approach, accepting a proposition when one source reports
it as true and the other source is silent, but rejecting it only if the sources agree
on its truth-value. Then, we obtain a strongly paraconsistent position.
Report on ϕ Prudent approach Optimistic approach
Case 1 (1, 1) Aϕ ∧R¬ϕ Aϕ ∧R¬ϕ
Case 2 (1,−) R¬ϕ Aϕ
Case 3 (1, 0) Rϕ ∧R¬ϕ Aϕ ∧A¬ϕ
Case 4 (−, 1) R¬ϕ Aϕ
Case 5 (−,−) − −
Case 6 (−, 0) Rϕ A¬ϕ
Case 7 (0, 1) Rϕ ∧R¬ϕ Aϕ ∧A¬ϕ
Case 8 (0,−) Rϕ A¬ϕ
Case 9 (0, 0) A¬ϕ ∧Rϕ A¬ϕ ∧Rϕ
In case of many sources of information of different quality, more interesting
approaches can be adopted in view of the preservation of the correctness and
completeness of the data (see [1] for an introduction).
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1.2 The perspectival character of acceptance
The main problem now is how cases of epistemic paraconsistency and para-
completeness can be handled in an appropriate way. We propose to exploit
the intuition that acceptance and rejection are perspective dependent, where a
perspective is a triple i = (σ, i, s) in which
1. σ is a member of a set Σ of subject matters;
2. i is a member of a set I of sources of information;
3. s is a subset of a set S of specific sets of epistemic standards.
The central idea underlying such an approach is that acceptance and rejection
are connected to epistemic justifications, where a justification is intended as
an epistemic ground for assuming a proposition p as a solution to a specific
problem relative to a subject matter σ ∈ Σ: a solution that derives from a
source of information i ∈ I and satisfies a set of standards s ∈ S.1 Hence,
we will model acceptance and rejection in accordance with the intuition that
an agent has a perspective on the world, which provides her with an epistemic
book, written in such a way that the results of a research based on the given
perspective are recorded in it. Furthermore, it is assumed that the book is
associated with an epistemic cell, which is a set of scenarios, thought of as
complete representations of the world that are consistent with the content of
the book. Finally, it is assumed that each epistemic book is subdivided into
two separate parts: a yes-box, where all the accepted propositions are to be
inserted, and a no-box, where all the rejected propositions are to be inserted.
Thus, we can introduce the following definitions
1. accepting := agent-dependent writing in the yes-box of the epistemic book.
2. rejecting := agent-dependent writing in the no-box of the epistemic book.
This initial model can be refined along different directions. In particular, we
are interested in
• introducing different books
• introducing primary books among all the books
1We will not pursue here a development of this framework from an epistemological point
of view. We only intend to propose a hierarchy of logical systems based on it and to show
how these systems help us to model different interesting concepts of acceptance and rejection.
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• distinguishing the no-box from the complement of the yes-box
• distinguishing the no-box from the set of negations in the yes-box
In any case, acceptance and rejection are assumed to be locally incompatible
attitudes, and the fundamental principle is endorsed that it is impossible for
the same agent to both accept and reject the same proposition under the same
perspective.
2 Basic non-perspectival systems
In this section, we present two systems of logic for an agent whose epistemic
space is based on a unique book. The first one is a basic system of acceptance,
where rejection is defined in terms of acceptance. The second system extends
the first by introducing rejection as a primitive epistemic attitudes.2
Definition 1. Let P be a set of propositional variables. The initial language
L is defined according to the following rules:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Aϕ | Rϕ
where p ∈ P . The other connectives and the dual modalities 〈A〉ϕ and 〈R〉ϕ
are defined as usual. Here, Aϕ / Rϕ says that the agent implicitly accepts /
rejects ϕ.
2.1 The basic system of acceptance
We first consider an agent with a unique book and a unique positive epistemic
attitude of acceptance. In this context, a unique epistemic cell is sufficient
for modeling the agent. The attitude of rejection can then be introduced by
definition in at least two different ways.
1. classical rejection: : Rϕ := A¬ϕ.
2. reflexive rejection: Rϕ := A¬Aϕ ∧ ¬Aϕ.
2In particular, we will treat implicit acceptance and rejection (see [4] ch. 9). In fact, it
would be possible to extend the following systems so as to introduce both implicit and explicit
attitudes and to show that the results obtained in the present setting carry over to the explicit
attitudes as well.
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The first definition is straightforward implementation of ET, and thus the no-
box of the book comes to coincide with the set of the negations of the propo-
sitions contained in the yes-box. By contrast, the idea underlying the second
definition is that rejecting ϕ is stronger than not accepting ϕ, but not so strong
as to imply A¬ϕ, so that rejecting ϕ is interpreted as the active acceptance of
not accepting ϕ. Hence, rejecting coincides with excluding the case that ϕ is in
the yes-box of the epistemic book, without incurring in the problem of identi-
fying the no-box with the complement of the yes-box, so that any proposition
that is not accepted is rejected.
Definition 2. (model): A basic model for L is a tuple M = 〈W,R, V 〉 where
W is a set of epistemic worlds.
R : W → ℘(W ) is an accessibility function.
V : P → ℘(W ) is a valuation function.
In addition, R satisfies the condition R(w) 6= ∅, for all w. Hence, no incon-
sistency is allowed within the epistemic book.
Definition 3. (truth in a model):
M,w |= p⇔ w ∈ V (p)
M,w |= ¬ϕ⇔M,w 6|= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= Aϕ⇔ ∀v(v ∈ R(w)⇒M,v |= ϕ)
Theorem 1. the logic A1 of basic acceptance, given by classical propositional
logic plus the following group of axioms
RA: ϕ/Aϕ
KA: A(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Aϕ→ Aψ)
DA: ¬(Aϕ ∧A¬ϕ)
is sound and complete with respect to the class of basic models.
Connection between rejection and acceptance.
classical reflexive
`A1 Rϕ→ ¬Aϕ `A1 Rϕ→ ¬Aϕ
`A1 Aϕ→ R¬ϕ ConA1(Aϕ ∧ ¬R¬ϕ)
`A1 Rϕ→ A¬ϕ ConA1(Rϕ ∧ ¬A¬ϕ)
Stronger systems can be obtained by introducing further conditions.
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Axioms on A Conditions on R
3A Aϕ→ ¬A¬Aϕ ∃v(v ∈ R(w) and R(v) ⊆ R(w)
4A Aϕ→ AAϕ v ∈ R(w)⇒ R(v) ⊆ R(w)
5A ¬A¬Aϕ→ Aϕ v ∈ R(w)⇒ R(w) ⊆ R(v)
If 3A is assumed, then reflective rejection comes to coincide with A¬Aϕ. If
4A is assumed, then 3A can be derived by DA. Finally, if both 4A and 5A are
assumed, we obtain a standard system of ideal acceptance, but the distinction
between reflexive rejection and non-acceptance is lost, since A¬Aϕ and ¬Aϕ
turn out to be equivalent. Hence, even if the basic system of acceptance is
appropriate for representing paraconsistent and paracomplete positions, when
the notion of reflexive rejection is assumed, it is not robust in doing that, since
the addition of the principles of positive and negative introspection, 4A and 5A,
destroys the distinction between classical and reflexive rejection.
2.2 The symmetric system of acceptance and rejection
Let us consider now an agent with a unique book and distinct attitudes of
acceptance and rejection. In this context, two epistemic modalities are required
for modeling the agent, since rejection is a primitive concept. As a consequence,
the connection between acceptance and rejection has to be characterized by
introducing specific axioms (see [7, 6] for further discussion).
Definition 4. (model): A symmetric model for L is a tupleM = 〈W,R1, R2, V 〉
where
W is a set of epistemic worlds.
R1 : W → ℘(W ) is used to model the positive attitude.
R2 : W → ℘(W ) is used to model the negative attitude.
V : P → ℘(W ) is a valuation function.
In addition, R1 and R2 satisfy the condition R1(w) ∩ R2(w) 6= ∅, for all
w ∈ W . The condition on R1 and R2 implies that R1(w) 6= ∅ and R2(w) 6= ∅,
for all w ∈W , so that inconsistencies in accepting and rejecting propositions are
prevented. A more general system can be obtained by dropping this condition,
but the principle of incompatibility between acceptance and rejection results
then invalid.
Definition 5. (truth in a model): beside the standard cases, we have
M,w |= Aϕ⇔ ∀v(v ∈ R1(w)⇒M, v |= ϕ)
M,w |= Rϕ⇔ ∀v(v ∈ R2(w)⇒M,v |= ¬ϕ)
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Theorem 2. the logic A2 of symmetric acceptance, given by classical proposi-
tional logic plus the following group of axioms
RA: ϕ/Aϕ
KA: A(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Aϕ→ Aψ)
RR: ¬ϕ/Rϕ
KR: R¬(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Rψ → Rϕ)
DAR: ¬(Aϕ ∧Rϕ)
is sound and complete with respect to the class of symmetric models.
A2 is a conservative extension of A1: just consider that any model M1 =
〈W,R1, V 〉 forA1 can be transformed into a modelM2 = 〈W,R1, R2, V 〉 forA2,
satisfying the same A1-formulas, by putting R2(w) = W , for every w ∈W , and
that any model M2 = 〈W,R1, R2, V 〉 for A2 can be transformed into a model
for A1, satisfying the same A1-formulas, by simply deleting R2.
Facts. (proofs are left as an exercise)
`A2 Aϕ→ ¬A¬ϕ `A2 Rϕ→ ¬R¬ϕ
`A2 Aϕ ∧Aψ ↔ A(ϕ ∧ ψ) `A2 Rϕ ∧Rψ ↔ R(ϕ ∨ ψ)
ConA2(¬Aϕ ∧ ¬A¬ϕ) ConA2(¬Rϕ ∧ ¬R¬ϕ)
It is not difficult to see that ConA2(Aϕ∧¬R¬ϕ) and ConA2(Rϕ∧¬A¬ϕ),
and so that in this system both paraconsistency and paracompleteness are rep-
resentable. In addition, the connection between A and R can be strengthened
in several ways.
Axioms on A, R Conditions on R and S
Aϕ→ R¬ϕ R2(w) ⊆ R1(w)
Rϕ→ A¬ϕ R1(w) ⊆ R2(w)
Rϕ↔ A¬ϕ R2(w) = R1(w)
Hence, system A1 with classical rejection can be viewed as the special case
of A2 where axiom Rϕ↔ A¬ϕ holds. Analogously, a system corresponding to
A1 with reflexive rejection might be obtained by adding an axiom to the effect
that Rϕ↔ A¬Aϕ ∧ ¬Aϕ.
In conclusion, introducing two epistemic attitudes constitutes a significant
advance in modeling paraconsistent and paracomplete positions. In the next
section, we go on in analyzing these attitudes and propose a way for defining
different notions of acceptance and rejection and different kinds of negation of
the equivalence thesis.
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3 Basic perspectival systems
In this section, we present systems of logic for an agent whose epistemic space
is based on different books. The epistemic space is thus constituted by a set of
epistemic cells, where each cell contains scenarios which are compatible with a
specific book. The agent is in a position to write different books according to
different perspectives, and any book only contains propositions about a specific
subject matter, which are accepted on the basis of a single source in an epistemic
situation characterized by specific standards.
3.1 The basic system of perspectival acceptance
Let us consider an agent with a set of books and a unique positive epistemic
attitude of acceptance. In this context, many epistemic cells are necessary for
modeling the agent, and more concepts of acceptance and rejection becomes
definable.3
Definition 6. (model): A perspectival model for L is a tupleM = 〈W, I, {Ri}i∈I , V 〉
where
W 6= ∅ is a set of epistemic worlds.
I 6= ∅ is a set of epistemic perspectives.
Ri : W → ℘(W ) is an accessibility function, for each i ∈ I.
V : P → ℘(W ) is a valuation function.
In addition, Ri satisfies the condition: Ri(w) 6= ∅, for all w and i ∈ I, so
that no inconsistency is allowed within the same epistemic book: no source is
inconsistent in itself, but they may not be jointly consistent.
Definition 7. (truth in a model): beside the standard cases, we have
M,w |= Aϕ⇔ ∃i ∈ I∀v(v ∈ Ri(w)⇒M, v |= ϕ)
The crucial characteristic of the present system is given by the truth def-
inition of a modal formula. Aϕ is true precisely when ϕ is true across some
cell and, since there are many cells and no constraint on their connections, it
is possible for an agent to accept both a proposition and its negation without
accepting their conjunction. Still, since no cell contains a scenario where con-
tradictions are true, the agent accepts no contradiction. In fact, the following
facts are provable in the class of perspectival models
3These models are introduced in [4] for modeling local reasoning.
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1. Aϕ ∧Aψ → A(ϕ ∧ ψ) is not valid;
2. ¬(Aϕ ∧A¬ϕ) is not valid;
3. ¬A(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) is valid.
Proof. Take W = {w,w1, w2}, I = {1, 2}, R1(w) = {w,w1}, R2(w) = {w,w2}.






Let V (p1) = R1(w) and V (p2) = R2(w). Then M,w |= Ap1; M,w |= A¬p2;
M,w |= Ap2; M,w 6|= A(p1 ∧ p2), and so the first two facts are proven. The
last fact is a straightforward consequence of the definition of truth.
The failure of Aϕ ∧ Aψ → A(ϕ ∧ ψ), ensuring the possibility of accepting
two propositions without accepting their conjunction, is due to the presence
of non-nested cells. The failure of Aϕ → ¬A¬ϕ, ensuring the possibility of
accepting contradictory propositions, is due to the presence of non-intersecting
cells. Indeed, in frames where all pairs of cells have non-empty intersection
Aϕ→ ¬A¬ϕ is valid, since a ϕ-cell intersects every other cell, and so in every
other cell there is a ϕ-scenario. Hence, it is the separation of the epistemic
cells that allows the agent to be consistent within each cell, while accepting
inconsistent propositions.
Theorem 3. the logic PA is axiomatized by the following group of axioms
RA: ϕ/Aϕ
MA: ϕ→ ψ/Aϕ→ Aψ
DA: ¬A(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)
is sound and complete with respect to the class of perspectival models.
The present framework allows us to model an extremely general notion of
acceptance. The connection between rejection and acceptance is as follows.
classical rejection reflexive rejection
ConPA(Rϕ ∧Aϕ) ConPA(Rϕ ∧Aϕ)
`PA Aϕ→ R¬ϕ ConPA(Aϕ ∧ ¬R¬ϕ)
`PA Rϕ→ A¬ϕ ConPA(Rϕ ∧ ¬A¬ϕ)
As we can see, when reflexive rejection is assumed, no particular connection
between acceptance and rejection is derivable. Thus, perspectival acceptance
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is useful to model epistemic attitudes that are sensitive to a switch of stan-
dards. As an example, in a setting where we are interested in modeling context-
sensitive epistemic agents (see e.g. [3, 12]), the set of propositions accepted in
a certain context, determined by a given set of standards s1 ⊆ S, will typically
be different from the set of propositions accepted in a context determined by
more stringent standards s2 ⊆ S. Hence, we obtain a suitable model of epis-
temic contextualism. Similarly, in a setting where we are interested in modeling
contrast-sensitive epistemic agents (see e.g. [10, 11]), the set of propositions
accepted as answers to a certain question, determined by the contrast class of
a given subject matter σ1 ∈ Σ, will typically be different from the set of propo-
sitions accepted as answers to a question determined by the contrast class of
a different subject matter σ2 ∈ Σ. Hence, we obtain a suitable model of epis-
temic contrastivism. Finally, in a setting where we are interested in modeling
source-sensitive epistemic agents, the set of propositions accepted as pieces of
information on a certain domain provided by a given source i1 ∈ I, will typically
be different from the set of propositions provided by a different source i2 ∈ I.
Hence, we obtain a suitable model of local knowledge (see e.g. [2, 4]).
As might be expected, one of the key problems in a perspectival framework
is how to put together data deriving from different perspectives. Here, we will
focus on three solution strategies. The first strategy consists in requiring that
agents accept a proposition just in case that proposition is acceptable under
all perspectives, which leads to a notion of absolute acceptance. The second
strategy consists in requiring that agents accept a proposition just in case that
proposition is acceptable under a special perspective, selected in virtue of some
positive characteristics. For example, perspectives could be selected because
they are determined by very fine-grained subject matters in Σ, by very high
standards in S, or by highly dependable sources in I. This strategy leads to a
notion of critical acceptance. The final strategy consists in requiring that agents
accept a proposition just in case that proposition is acceptable under a certain
class of perspectives, as determined according to a given ordering. For example,
perspectives could be ordered in view of the granularity of the subject matters,
the highness of the standards, or the dependability of the sources. This strategy
leads to a notion of ordinal acceptance.
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3.2 First strategy: absolute acceptance
The language is extended by introducing a modality AU for absolute, or uni-
versal, acceptance. The intended meaning of AUϕ is that ϕ is accepted inde-
pendently of any perspective, so that ϕ holds in all the epistemic cells. The
definition of truth is extended accordingly:
• M,w |= AUϕ⇔ ∀i ∈ I∀v(v ∈ Ri(w)⇒M, v |= ϕ)
Theorem 4. the logic PU, obtained by adding to PA
RU: ϕ/AUϕ
KU: AU (ϕ→ ψ)→ (AUϕ→ AUψ)
IU: AU (ϕ→ ψ)→ (Aϕ→ Aψ)
is sound and complete with respect to the class of perspectival models.




RU and KU state that AU is a normal modality. IU is the crucial axiom
and implies that what is absolutely accepted is both accepted in every cell and
classically rejected in no cell. This is due to the fact that no cell is empty.
In addition, IU allows us to derive MA from RU. In this setting, rejection is
defined according to the classical definition.
Absolute acceptance is useful to model the set of propositions that are not
touched by a perspective shift. As an example, supposing that we are interested
in modeling epistemic agents assessing different empirical theories relative to
a shared empirical basis, the propositions in the basis are absolutely accepted.
In this case, perspectives are determined by theories, intended as sources of
information, while the empirical basis is determined by our measuring systems,
whose results are invariant under a theory shift, even though the interpretation
of these results is not invariant. It is in general a matter of doubt whether there
could be a stable set of absolutely acceptable propositions. Still, within any
logical system, the set of logically valid propositions is a set of this kind.
If absolute acceptance is available, we get new options for interpreting the
connection between rejection and acceptance within the classical framework. An
intuitive possibility is to work with two concepts of rejection, where the classical
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one is associated with a strong concept of absolute rejection. What we get is a
model of two epistemic attitudes: a prudent one, according to which the best
thing to do is (i) to reject ϕ when its negation holds in some cell and (ii) to
accept it only when it holds in all the cells; and an optimistic one, according to
which it is better (i) to accept ϕ when it holds in some cell and (ii) to reject
it only when its negation holds in all the cells. As to the relation between
acceptance and rejection, we obtain then
Prudent version Optimistic version
`PU RUϕ→ ¬Aϕ `PU Rϕ→ ¬AUϕ
ConPU(Aϕ ∧ ¬RU¬ϕ) `PU AUϕ→ R¬ϕ
`PU RUϕ→ A¬ϕ ConPU(Rϕ ∧ ¬AU¬ϕ)
(strong paraconsistency) (strong paracompleteness)
3.3 Second strategy: critical acceptance
We extend our language by introducing a modality AC for critical acceptance.
The intended meaning of ACϕ is that ϕ is accepted on the basis of the most
critical perspective, if any, so that ϕ holds in the epistemic cell that represents
this perspective. A model is a tuple M =
〈





W, I, {Ri}i∈I , V
〉
as before
2. R(w) ∩Ri(w) 6= ∅, for all i ∈ I
Here R represents agent’s critical point of view, and condition 2 is a constraint
that ensures that any cell contains at least a critical scenario, which is a scenario
admissible according to the critical perspective. Hence, not all critical scenarios
are excluded in a less critical cell. The definition of truth is extended so that:
• M,w |= ACϕ⇔ ∀v(v ∈ R(w)⇒M, v |= ϕ)
Theorem 5. the logic PC, obtained by adding to PA
RC: ϕ/ACϕ
KC: AC(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ACϕ→ ACψ)
IC: ACϕ→ Aϕ ∧ ¬A¬ϕ
is sound and complete with respect to the previous class of models.
RC andKC state thatAC is a normal modality. IC states that what is critically
accepted is accepted and classically rejected in no cell. This is due to the
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fact that every cell intersects the critical cell. Note that RC and IC imply
¬A(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ).
Critical acceptance is useful to model the set of propositions that are justified
by the best theories at our disposal. As an example, in a setting where we are
interested in modeling epistemic agents comparing different empirical theories
against the same empirical basis, the theory that fits at best the empirical
evidence is critically accepted.
As before, critical acceptance allows us to define two concepts of rejection and
to introduce the distinction between prudent and optimistic epistemic attitudes,
thus obtaining the following results on the relation between acceptance and
rejection.
Prudent version Optimistic version
`PC RCϕ→ ¬Aϕ `PC Rϕ→ ¬ACϕ
ConPC(Aϕ ∧ ¬RC¬ϕ) ConPC(ACϕ ∧ ¬R¬ϕ)
ConPC(R
Cϕ ∧ ¬A¬ϕ) ConPC(Rϕ ∧ ¬AC¬ϕ)
(liberal paraconsistency) (liberal paracompleteness)
The prudent attitude, according to which an agent only accepts what is
critically legitimate and rejects what is rejected in at least one cell, seems to
match the epistemic attitude underlying critical rationalism.
3.4 Third strategy: ordinal acceptance
We extend our language by introducing a modality ≤ for ordinal acceptance4.
The intended meaning of ϕ ≤ ψ is that, for every perspective which accepts ϕ,
there is a perspective accepting ψ that is at least as secure, so that ψ is to be ac-
cepted, provided ϕ is accepted. A model is a tupleM =
〈





W, I, {Ri}i∈I , V
〉
as before
2. ≤w ⊆ I × I is reflexive and transitive for all w ∈W
The definition of truth is extended so that:
• M,w |= ϕ ≤ ψ ⇔ for all j
if ∀v(v ∈ Rj(w)⇒M,v |= ϕ)
then ∃i(j ≤w i and ∀v(v ∈ Ri(w)⇒M, v |= ψ)
4It is worth noting that the ordering concerns the perspectives and not the propositions,
as in standard approaches. See [5] for a discussion.
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Theorem 6. the logic PO, obtained by adding to PA
RO: ϕ→ ψ/ϕ ≤ ψ
1O: Aϕ ∨ ϕ ≤ ψ
2O: ϕ ≤ ψ → (Aϕ→ Aψ)
3O: ϕ ≤ ψ ∧ ψ ≤ ψ′ → ϕ ≤ ψ′
is sound and complete with respect to the previous class of models.
RO encodes the intuitive assumption according to which consequences of ϕ are
at least as acceptable as ϕ, so that any consequence of ϕ is to be accepted,
if ϕ is accepted. 1O states that, if ϕ is not accepted, then no proposition
is less acceptable than ϕ. 2O states that any proposition that is at least as
acceptable as ϕ is accepted, provided that ϕ is accepted. Finally, 3O states
that ≤ is transitive. Hence, since ≤ is also reflexive, by RO, ≤ turns out to be
a preorder.
Introducing an ordering on the set of perspectives allows us to define a kind
of critical acceptance.
Definition 8. induced critical acceptance.
AC≤ϕ := > ≤ ϕ
Note that, semantically, AC≤ϕ is true at a certain world precisely when, for
every epistemic cell, there is a non-worse epistemic cell through which ϕ is true.
Hence, accepting ϕ is a best option from every perspective. This notion obeys
some significant logical principles:
ϕ/AC≤ϕ
ϕ→ ψ/AC≤ϕ→ AC≤ψ
ϕ ≤ ψ → (AC≤ϕ→ AC≤ψ)
AC≤ϕ→ Aϕ, and so ¬AC≤(ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)
Still, this notion of acceptance allows for accepting both a proposition and its
negation. This is due to the possibility of infinite ascending chains of epistemic
cells. To be sure, let us consider the following model:〈
W, I, {≤w}w∈W , {Ri}i∈I , V
〉
where W = I = N and
≤w = ≤ for each w ∈W
Ri(w) = {i}, for each w ∈W and i ∈ I
V (p) = 2N
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Then, for each world w, and each j, if p0 (¬p0) holds at every world in Rj(w),
then ¬p0 (p0) holds at every world in Rj+1(w), and so both AC≤p and AC≤¬p
are true at w. As a corollary, since every cell is consistent, the acceptance of
two propositions does not imply the acceptance of their conjunction. As to the
relation of acceptance and classical rejection, all combinations are now allowed.
3.5 Completeness of the perspectival systems
In this final section, we will show that the system obtained by combining abso-
lute, critical and ordinal acceptance is complete with respect to the perspectival
semantics. To the best of our knowledge, the proof is original. It exploits a
canonicity argument and it is such that proofs of soundness and completeness
for the three component systems can be readily extracted from it.
The system PUCO of ordinal acceptance with absolute and critical modali-
ties is a perspectival system characterized by ruleRU, and the following axioms:
KU: AU (ϕ→ ψ)→ (AUϕ→ AUψ) IC: ACϕ→ Aϕ ∧ ¬A¬ϕ
1U: AUϕ→ ACϕ 1O: Aϕ ∨ ϕ ≤ ψ
2U: AU (ϕ→ ψ)→ ϕ ≤ ψ 2O: ϕ ≤ ψ → (Aϕ→ Aψ)
KC: AC(ϕ→ ψ)→ (ACϕ→ ACψ) 3O: ϕ ≤ ψ ∧ ψ ≤ ψ′ → ϕ ≤ ψ′
RA, RC, RO are now derivable and 2U together with 2O implies IU.
Definition 9. A model for the previous system is a tuple〈
W, I,R, {≤w}w∈W , {Ri}i∈I
〉
where
(1) W is a non-empty set of epistemic worlds
(2) I is a non-empty set of perspectives
(3) R : W → ℘(W ) satisfying R(w) ∩Ri(w) 6= ∅, for all i ∈ I
(4) ≤w is a preorder defined on I, for each w ∈W
(5) Ri : W → ℘(W ) is an accessibility function, for all i ∈ I
(6) V : P → ℘(W ) is a modal valuation function
We get completeness by constructing a canonical model and proving a canon-
icity lemma and a truth lemma. Let
• W be the set of all the maximally PUCO-consistent sets of formulas;
• I is the set of all the PUCO-formulas.
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Hence, indices in I and formulas coincide. For w ∈W , let
(1) w/U =
{
ϕ | AUϕ ∈ w}
(2) w/C =
{
ϕ | ACϕ ∈ w}
(3) w/i =
{ϕ | w/U, i ` ϕ} if Ai ∈ ww/U if Ai /∈ w
Note that w/U , w/C and w/i are closed set. Indeed, suppose w/U `PUCO
ϕ. Then w `PUCO AUϕ, and so AUϕ ∈ w, since w is maximally consistent.
Thus, ϕ ∈ w/C, by the definition of w/C. Similarly for w/C and w/i.
Lemma 1. w/i =
⋂ {v ∈W | w/i ⊆ v} and w/C = ⋂ {v ∈W | w/C ⊆ v}.
Proof. Since both w/C and w/i are closed sets, they coincide with the intersec-
tion of all the maximally consistent sets that contain them.
Lemma 2. ϕ ∈ w/i⇒ Aϕ ∈ w.
Proof. Suppose ϕ ∈ w/i. If Ai ∈ w, then AU (i → ϕ) ∈ w, by the definition of
w/i. Thus, (Ai→ Aϕ) ∈ w, by IU, and so Aϕ ∈ w. If Ai /∈ w, then AUϕ ∈ w,
and so Aϕ ∈ w, again by IU.
Definition 10. The canonical model is the tuple〈
W, I,R, {≤w}w∈W , {Ri}i∈I , V
〉
such that
(i) R(w) is such that v ∈ R(w)⇔ w/C ⊆ v;
(ii) ≤w is such that j ≤w i⇔ (j ≤ i) ∈ w;
(iii) Ri(w) is such that v ∈ Ri(w)⇔ w/i ⊆ v;
(iv) V is such that w ∈ V (pi)⇔ pi ∈ w.
Some preliminary facts.
Fact 1. Aϕ ∈ w ⇔ ∃i(ϕ ∈ w/i).
Proof. Suppose Aϕ ∈ w. Then ϕ ∈ w/ϕ, by definition of w/ϕ. Suppose
∃i(ϕ ∈ w/i). Then Aϕ ∈ w, by lemma 2.
Fact 2. AUϕ ∈ w ⇔ ∀i(ϕ ∈ w/i).
Proof. Suppose AUϕ ∈ w. Then ϕ ∈ w/U , and so ϕ ∈ w/i, by definition of
w/U and w/i. Suppose ∀i(ϕ ∈ w/i). Then ϕ ∈ w/>, and so ϕ ∈ w/U , since
w/> = w/U by the definition of w/>.
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Fact 3. ϕ ∈ w/i⇔ (i ≤ ϕ) ∈ w.
Proof. Suppose ϕ ∈ w/i. Then AU (i → ϕ) ∈ w, by the definition of w/i, and
so (i ≤ ϕ) ∈ w, by IO. Suppose ϕ /∈ w/i. Then Ai ∈ w, by 1O, and so
(i ≤ ϕ) /∈ w, by 2O.
Fact 4. ∃i((ϕ ≤ i) ∈ w and ψ ∈ w/i)⇔ (ϕ ≤ ψ) ∈ w.
Proof. Suppose (ϕ ≤ i) ∈ w and ψ ∈ w/i. Then (ϕ ≤ i) ∈ w and (i ≤ ψ) ∈ w,
by fact 2, and so (ϕ ≤ ψ) ∈ w, by 3O. Suppose (ϕ ≤ ψ) ∈ w. Since (ψ ≤ ψ) ∈ w,
ψ ∈ w/ψ by fact 2, and so (ϕ ≤ ψ) ∈ w and ψ ∈ w/ψ.
PART I: Canonicity Lemma
The canonical model is a model for the logic. That ≤w is reflexive and transitive
follows from RU, 2U, and 3O. That R(w) ∩ Ri(w) 6= ∅, for all i ∈ I, is
consequence of IC. Indeed, since ACϕ → ¬A¬ϕ ∈ w, by IC, w/C ∪ w/i is
consistent, for all i ∈ I. Therefore w/C ∪ w/i is included in some maximally
consistent set v, so that v ∈ R(w) ∩Ri(w).
PART II: Truth Lemma
Case 1: M,w |= Aϕ⇔ Aϕ ∈ w.
Proof. By the definition of |= and IH:
M,w |= Aϕ⇔ ∃i ∈ I∀v(v ∈ Ri(w)⇒ ϕ ∈ v)
M,w |= Aϕ⇔ ∃i ∈ I(ϕ ∈ w/i), by lemma 1
M,w |= Aϕ⇔ Aϕ ∈ w, by fact 1
Case 2: M,w |= AUϕ⇔ AUϕ ∈ w.
Proof. By the definition of |= and IH:
M,w |= AUϕ⇔ ∀i ∈ I∀v(v ∈ Ri(w)⇒ ϕ ∈ v)
M,w |= AUϕ⇔ ∀i(ϕ ∈ w/i), by lemma 1
M,w |= AUϕ⇔ AUϕ ∈ w, by fact 2
Case 3: M,w |= ACϕ⇔ ACϕ ∈ w.
Proof. By the definition of |= and IH:
M,w |= ACϕ⇔ ∀v(v ∈ R(w)⇒ ϕ ∈ v)
M,w |= ACϕ⇔ ϕ ∈ w/C, by lemma 1
M,w |= ACϕ⇔ ACϕ ∈ w, by def. w/C
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Case 4: M,w |= ϕ ≤ ψ ⇔ (ϕ ≤ ψ) ∈ w.
Proof. By the definition of |= and IH:
M,w |= ϕ ≤ ψ ⇔ ∀j(ϕ ∈ w/j ⇒ ∃i(j ≤w i and ψ ∈ w/i))
j ≤w i⇔ (j ≤ i) ∈ w, by def. ≤w
ψ ∈ w/i⇔ (j ≤ ψ) ∈ w, by fact 3
M,w |= ϕ ≤ ψ ⇔ ∀j(ϕ ∈ w/j ⇒ ∃i((j ≤ i) ∈ w and (j ≤ ψ) ∈ w))
M,w |= ϕ ≤ ψ ⇔ ∀j(ϕ ∈ w/j ⇒ (j ≤ ψ) ∈ w), by fact 4
M,w |= ϕ ≤ ψ ⇔ ∀j((j ≤ ϕ) ∈ w ⇒ (j ≤ ψ) ∈ w), by fact 3
M,w |= ϕ ≤ ψ ⇔ (ϕ ≤ ψ) ∈ w, by the reflexivity and transitivity of ≤w
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented systems of perspectival attitudes where phe-
nomena of paraconsistency and paracompleteness can be handled and shown
that they are adequate with respect to a semantical framework in which the
epistemic space is subdivided in different cells. We have also hinted how these
systems can be used for interpreting some interesting epistemological theses. A
more general study should take into account at least three kinds of develop-
ments. The first is an analysis of the dynamics of the systems, along the lines
proposed in [6] for the two cells space. The second one concerns the role of
the sources in generating epistemic states and the connection with justification
logic. The final one concerns the role of subject matters in ordering the set of the
epistemic cells and the connection with inquisitive logic. These developments
are left for future work.
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